A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism

Campbell Brown

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Ethical descriptivism is the view that all ethical properties are descriptive properties. An argument for this view proposed by Frank Jackson begins with the premise that the ethical supervenes on the descriptive; any worlds that differ ethically must differ also descriptively. This chapter observes that Jackson’s argument follows a curious route, taking a linguistic detour between metaphysical starting and ending points, and raises some worries stemming from this. It then proposes an improved version of the argument, which avoids these worries, and responds to some potential objections to this version of the argument.

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1986On the Plurality of Worlds 2000From Metaphysics to Ethics 2004Moral realism: a defence 2008Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?

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2014Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism 2024The Moral Universe 2010Are normative properties descriptive properties?

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