Kant’s Critique of Spinoza

Abstract

Contemporary philosophers frequently assume that Kant never seriously engaged with Spinoza or Spinozism - certainly not before the break of 'Der Pantheismusstreit', or within the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. Offering an alternative reading of key pre-critical texts and to some of the Critique's most central chapters, Omri Boehm challenges this common assumption. He argues that Kant not only is committed to Spinozism in early essays such as 'The One Possible Basis' and'New Elucidation,' but also takes up Spinozist metaphysics as Transcendental Realism's most consistent form in the 'Critique of Pure Reason'.

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