Local State Marketism

Abstract

Drawing on an institutional analysis of China's urban housing and land market, this research demonstrates how the triangular relations among the central government, local governments, and the market evolved in response to new opportunities continuously created by market transformation and policies strictly enforced by the central government. In particular, the authors argue that the territory-based coalition between local governments and selective enterprises in the reform era is a persistent rather than a transitory phenomenon. Local state marketism-which highlights the power imbalance among the central government, local governments, and society; conflicted interests within the state; and a dynamic, volatile, and paradoxical network at the disposal of local governments-is proposed as a conceptual framework that accounts for the evolution of triangular relations among the central government, local governments, and the market in reform-era China.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 59 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.