Greening Constitutions with Environmental Rights: Testing the Isomorphism Thesis

Abstract

Abstract Why do some countries have constitutional environmental rights while others do not? In this paper, I conduct statistical analyses to respond to this inquiry. Through studying the impact of intraregional constitutional design, I aim to understand why states adopt environmental rights. I argue that regional isomorphism—i.e., the tendency among states within a region to converge on certain policies—may explain the trend toward constitutionalization of environmental rights. In this paper I (1) define and provide historical background on environmental rights, (2) describe theories which support regional isomorphism as a means of explaining the adoption of constitutional environmental rights, and (3) conduct statistical tests to determine the validity of the regional isomorphism thesis. I find that the enactment of constitutional environmental rights within a region does not increase the likelihood that another state within the same region will include environmental rights within its constitution.

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