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Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect · Study

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PreprintBank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect

Tito Cordella2000

OA

Preprintgreen2000

Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect

Tito Cordella · Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati

55 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Economic theories and models

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References

1983Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity 1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications 1988Herd Behavior and Investment 2000Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?1998Private and Public Supply of Liquidity 1997Microeconomics of Banking 1993Contemporary Banking Theory

Cited by

2016Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States 2001Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking 2019Bailouts and systemic insurance 2009The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions - The Case of Theeuropean Union 2013What Do We Know about the Impact of Government Interventions in the Banking Sector? The Assessment of Various Bailout Programs on Bank Behavior

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Details

Year2000

Typepreprint

Published2000-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations55

Files0 public / 0

ShelfBanking stability, regulation, efficiency

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doi10.2139/ssrn.188153

openalex_workW1555783470

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