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Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
13 references·5 citing·30 second hop
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications (2001)Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revi…Stable marriage and indifference (1994)Stable marriage and indiffere…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (1991)The Stable Marriage Problem: …The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…Some remarks on the stable matching problem (1985)Some remarks on the stable ma…Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem (1985)Ms. Machiavelli and the Stabl…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching (1984)Stability and Polarization of…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…The stable marriage problem (1971)The stable marriage problemStable marriage assignment for unequal sets (1970)Stable marriage assignment fo…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Hybrid offering configuration in servitization of manufacturing (2023)Hybrid offering configuration…Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019)Beyond Truth-Telling: Prefere…Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents (2017)Satisfied two-sided matching:…Improved approximation results for the stable marriage problem (2007)Improved approximation result…Two algorithms for the Student-Project Allocation problem (2006)Two algorithms for the Studen…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (1977)Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities (1997)A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications (2003)Stability in Supply Chain Networks (2008)An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage (1987)A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)Hard variants of stable marriage (2002)Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2013)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignMatching with Contracts (2005)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1991The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms910 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1985Some remarks on the stable matching problem431 cited
  • 1971The stable marriage problem386 cited
  • 1984Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching363 cited
  • 1994Stable marriage and indifference283 cited
  • 1970Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets226 cited
  • 1985Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem202 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Two algorithms for the Student-Project Allocation problem139 cited
  • 2019Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions134 cited

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  • 2017Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents71 cited
  • 2007Improved approximation results for the stable marriage problem69 cited
  • 2023Hybrid offering configuration in servitization of manufacturing11 cited