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Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation · Study

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Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation

Herschel I. Grossman, John B. Van Huyck

1985-07-01reportNational Bureau of Economic Research532 citationsgreen

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Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Credit Risk and Financial Regulations

Abstract

bad states of the world.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 532 citations exist upstream.

References

1981Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

1983Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital

Cited by

1996The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”

1993The Unstable EMS

2011The Optimal Level of International Reserves for Emerging Market Countries: A New Formula and Some Applications

2009Sovereign default and debt renegotiation

2009The Costs of Sovereign Default

2000Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter

1999International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability

1989External debt, capital flight and political risk

Details

Year1985

Typereport

VenueNational Bureau of Economic Research

Languageen

Files0 public / 0

Identifiers

doi10.3386/w1673

openalex_workW1557971685

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