SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies
16 references·16 citing·27 second hopsampled
Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Companies (2004)Incentives vs. Control: An Analysis of U.…Industry costs of equity (1997)Industry costs of equityDo Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? (1997)Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensi…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure (1996)Theory of the firm; manageria…Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value (1990)Additional evidence on equity…Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flo…The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)The Structure of Corporate Ow…The market for corporate control (1983)The market for corporate cont…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests (1973)Risk, Return, and Equilibrium…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…A Literature Review on Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Past, Present, and Future* (2021)A Literature Review on Corpor…The effect of family control on value and risk-taking in Mexico: A socioemotional wealth approach (2017)The effect of family control …Why do Boards Differ? Because Owners Do: Assessing Ownership Impact on Board Composition (2013)Why do Boards Differ? Because…Does family ownership create or destroy value? Evidence from Canada (2013)Does family ownership create …Management Quality and Antitakeover Provisions (2011)Management Quality and Antita…Large shareholders’ combinations in family firms: Prevalence and performance effects (2011)Large shareholders’ combinati…R&D activity in Canada: does corporate ownership structure matter? (2010)R&D activity in Canada: does …Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict (2010)Corporate governance and stak…Family Control and Stock Market Reactions to Innovation Announcements (2009)Family Control and Stock Mark…Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets (2008)Dual-Class Shares and Audit P…Timing and Wealth Effects of German Dual Class Stock Unifications (2007)Timing and Wealth Effects of …“One Share – One Vote: A European Rule?” (2006)“One Share – One Vote: A Euro…Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership (2005)Why Do Firms Become Widely He…Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices (2004)Which Investors Fear Expropri…Ownership and Control in Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence (2003)Ownership and Control in Join…Changes in Equity Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm (2003)Changes in Equity Ownership a…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices (1965)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns (1992)Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds (1993)On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance (1997)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework (1998)Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies (2003)New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index (2010)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1973Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests14,248 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1997Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?6,790 cited
  • 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
  • 1997Industry costs of equity5,793 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value4,311 cited
  • 1996Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure4,245 cited
  • 1983The market for corporate control

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

4,145 cited

Cited by

  • 2009Family Control and Stock Market Reactions to Innovation Announcements81 cited
  • 2013Why do Boards Differ? Because Owners Do: Assessing Ownership Impact on Board Composition70 cited
  • 2005Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership69 cited
  • 2011Large shareholders’ combinations in family firms: Prevalence and performance effects68 cited
  • 2011Management Quality and Antitakeover Provisions64 cited
  • 2010Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict63 cited
  • 2008Dual-Class Shares and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the Canadian Markets59 cited
  • 2004Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices58 cited
  • 2003Ownership and Control in Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence57 cited
  • 2017The effect of family control on value and risk-taking in Mexico: A socioemotional wealth approach50 cited
  • 2006“One Share – One Vote: A European Rule?”49 cited
  • 2007Timing and Wealth Effects of German Dual Class Stock Unifications44 cited
  • 2013Does family ownership create or destroy value? Evidence from Canada42 cited
  • 2003Changes in Equity Ownership and Changes in the Market Value of the Firm39 cited
  • 2021A Literature Review on Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Past, Present, and Future*34 cited
  • 2010R&D activity in Canada: does corporate ownership structure matter?28 cited