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Pensions and Firm Performance
16 references·1 citing·40 second hop
Pensions and Firm Performance (1987)Pensions and Firm PerformanceWhy Federal Workers Don't Quit (1987)Why Federal Workers Don't QuitWork Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets (1986)Work Incentives, Hierarchy, a…The Labor Contract and True Economic Pension Liabilities (1985)The Labor Contract and True E…The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans (1985)The Economic Function of Unde…Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets (1984)Work Incentives, Hierarchy, a…Incentive Effects of Pensions (1983)Incentive Effects of PensionsWhat are Corporate Pension Liabilities? (1982)What are Corporate Pension Li…Pensions as Severance Pay (1982)Pensions as Severance PayPension Funding Decisions, Interest Rate Assumptions and Share Prices (1982)Pension Funding Decisions, In…Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility (1982)Fringe Benefits and Labor Mob…Compensation, Safety, and Absenteeism: Evidence from the Paper Industry (1981)Compensation, Safety, and Abs…Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions (1981)Agency, Earnings Profiles, Pr…Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? (1979)Why Is There Mandatory Retire…Trade Unions in the Production Process (1978)Trade Unions in the Productio…The Economics of Trade Unions. (1962)The Economics of Trade Unions.The Economics of Trade Unions (1962)The Economics of Trade UnionsTaxation and Saving**I am grateful to the National Science Foundation (Grant Number SBR95-11321) for financial support. During the course of this project, I have benefitted from discussions with numerous friends and colleagues, and my intellectual debts are too numerous to list. However, I am especially grateful to Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and Kenneth Judd. I am also indebted to Sita Nataraj for catching a number of errors, and for suggesting a variety of expositional improvements. (2002)Taxation and Saving**I am gra…The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers (1974)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men (1988)Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers (1995)Happiness and Productivity (2015)Market wages, reservation wages, and retirement decisions (1980)Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy (1981)Employment tenure and earnings profiles in Japan and the United States : comments (1992)The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1997)Human Capital-Driven Acquisition: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (2020)Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. (1972)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour (1990)The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition (1993)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Promotions and Wage Growth (1996)Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality (1990)Pension Plan Funding and Corporate Debt Ratings (1998)Taxation and Saving (1999)Allocative efficiency vs. X-Efficiency (1966)A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment (1985)Efficiency of resource usage and city size (1986)Meta-Analytic Review of Employee Turnover as a Predictor of Firm Performance (2011)Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis (2020)The Costs of Worker Displacement (1987)Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There Evidence of Job-Lock? (1993)Pensions, Bonding, and Lifetime Jobs (1993)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages (1995)A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem (2008)Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance (1989)Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers (1990)Discounting State and Local Pension Liabilities (2009)Industry environments and new venture formations in U.S. manufacturing: A conceptual and empirical analysis of demand determinants (1996)Examining the Incidence of Downsizing and Its Effect on Establishment Performance (2000)Unions and wage inequality (2004)Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation (1986)Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade (1989)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?2,037 cited
  • 1981Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions1,207 cited
  • 1978Trade Unions in the Production Process386 cited
  • 1986Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets335 cited
  • 1984Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets326 cited
  • 1985The Labor Contract and True Economic Pension Liabilities227 cited
  • 1982What are Corporate Pension Liabilities?200 cited
  • 1982Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility171 cited
  • 1985The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans120 cited
  • 1962The Economics of Trade Unions.117 cited
  • 1983Incentive Effects of Pensions112 cited
  • 1981Compensation, Safety, and Absenteeism: Evidence from the Paper Industry111 cited
  • 1987Why Federal Workers Don't Quit101 cited
  • 1982Pensions as Severance Pay99 cited
  • 1982Pension Funding Decisions, Interest Rate Assumptions and Share Prices99 cited
  • 1962The Economics of Trade Unions79 cited

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  • 2002Taxation and Saving**I am grateful to the National Science Foundation (Grant Number SBR95-11321) for financial support. During the course of this project, I have benefitted from discussions with numerous friends and colleagues, and my intellectual debts are too numerous to list. However, I am especially grateful to Alan Auerbach, William Gale, and Kenneth Judd. I am also indebted to Sita Nataraj for catching a number of errors, and for suggesting a variety of expositional improvements.20 cited