Corporate governance, regulation and supervision of banks

Abstract

fi rms. In some countries, managerial control is legally possible through structures such as trusts. However, in others it is associated with dispersed shareholder structures. Here, however, another concern may be the stability of shareholders when share ownership is dispersed. In this case, it may be diffi cult to oblige shareholders to bail-in (2) ailing banks in the event of under-capitalisation. This raises some trade-offs between various shareholder structures and the relative power of managers vis-a-vis shareholders. In particular, shareholder structure, management incentives and the structure of the board of directors are evaluated with respect to their impact on a bank’s risk.

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