Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations

Carlo Carraro · Carmen Marchiori

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Game Theory and Applications International Relations and Foreign Policy Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that players are asked to vote on issue linkage before starting negotiations. Under what conditions would they vote in favour of issue linkage? The answer to this question is not trivial. Issue linkage may indeed increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a public good (a typical issue characterised by strong incentives to free-ride). However, at the same time, issue linkage may reduce the number of cooperating players on the other economic issue which is linked to the provision of a public good. Players therefore face a trade-off. This paper analyses this trade-off within a game-theoretic framework and shows under what conditions issue linkage is players' equilibrium strategy.

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References

1994Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements 1993Strategies for the international protection of the environment 1991Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country 1983Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties 1999A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures 1992International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions 1997Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities 1997Equilibrium Binding Agreements

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