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PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS: A SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL OPENNESS TO THE WORLD1
15 references·3 citing·34 second hop
PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS: A SUBJECTIVIST ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTUAL OPENNESS TO THE WORLD1 (2011)PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND PERCEPTUAL AWAREN…Philosophical Perspectives (2020)Philosophical PerspectivesPhenomenal Intentionality (2013)Phenomenal IntentionalityThe Self and Self-Knowledge (2012)The Self and Self-KnowledgeGrasping Phenomenal Properties (2007)Grasping Phenomenal PropertiesContemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (2007)Contemporary Debates in the P…Which Properties are Represented in Perception? (2006)Which Properties are Represen…Perceptual Experience (2006)Perceptual ExperienceThe Limits of Self-Awareness (2004)The Limits of Self-AwarenessThe Transparency of Experience (2002)The Transparency of ExperienceThe problem of perception (2002)The problem of perceptionThe Significance of Consciousness (1998)The Significance of Conscious…Perception: A Representative Theory. (1978)Perception: A Representative …Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. (1958)Perceiving: A Philosophical S…Perceiving : A Philosophical Study (1957)Perceiving : A Philosophical …XII.—Symposium—The Status of Sense-Data (1914)XII.—Symposium—The Status of …Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness? (2021)Is There a Persuasive Argumen…The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm (2016)The experience property frame…Self-Awareness (2016)Self-AwarenessThe varieties of reference (1982)Intentionality (1983)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Is There a Perceptual Relation? (2006)Knowledge and success from ability (2008)Perceptual Content Defended (2011)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Knowledge and the Flow of Information. (1983)Thinking about Consciousness (2002)Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction (2010)A materialist theory of the mind (2017)Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. (1979)From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief. (1983)Simulating Minds (2006)The Phenomenological Mind (2007)The Unreliability of Naive Introspection (2008)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Behavioral dimensions of climate change: drivers, responses, barriers, and interventions (2011)On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit (2014)Things and Places - How the mind connects with the world (2) (2004)Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space (2009)Thought and Reference (1994)Truth and the Absence of Fact (2001)Knowledge as Credit for True Belief (2003)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992)Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? (1993)In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience (2009)Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism (2011)Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception (2014)Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (1999)Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons" (2000)Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience (2007)Imagining as a Guide to Possibility (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2002The Transparency of Experience1,123 cited
  • 1998The Significance of Consciousness810 cited
  • 1958Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.773 cited
  • 1978Perception: A Representative Theory.605 cited
  • 2004The Limits of Self-Awareness560 cited
  • 2006Which Properties are Represented in Perception?541 cited
  • 2007Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind503 cited
  • 2006Perceptual Experience449 cited
  • 1957Perceiving : A Philosophical Study422 cited
  • 2002The problem of perception386 cited
  • 2013Phenomenal Intentionality239 cited
  • 2020Philosophical Perspectives206 cited
  • 1914XII.—Symposium—The Status of Sense-Data84 cited
  • 2012The Self and Self-Knowledge68 cited
  • 2007Grasping Phenomenal Properties65 cited

Cited by

  • 2016The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm44 cited
  • 2016Self-Awareness44 cited

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  • 2021Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?33 cited