Patent Licensing in a Mixed Oligopoly with a Foreign Firm

Guangliang Ye

12 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Intellectual Property and Patents Intellectual Property Law Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

This paper investigates optimal licensing in a mixed oligopoly with a foreign firm. It is the first to compare licensing by means of a fixed fee and by means of a royalty when the innovator is a public firm. In contrast to a private oligopoly, we show that license via a fixed fee is superior to license via a royalty for the innovator.

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2004On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition 2005LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL*

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2015Privatization in the presence of patent licensing

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