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• 1999Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy124 cited
• 2004Bureaucrats or Politicians?112 cited
• 1995Central bank independence: A critical view from a developing country perspective57 cited
• 2002The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy56 cited
• 2000Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?52 cited
• 1993Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence50 cited
• 2011Stabilization Policies45 cited
• 1997Monetary politics and unemployment persistence44 cited
• 1999The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy44 cited
• 1999Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-199742 cited
• 2010Falling Behind the Curve: A Positive Analysis of Stop-Start Monetary Policies and the Great Inflation42 cited
• 2001Inflation Targeting and the Unemployment-Inflation Trade-Off34 cited
• 2002Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy26 cited
• 1994The Costs and Benefits of Disinflation25 cited