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Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies
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References

  • 2005THE STATE OF EXCEPTION3,837 cited
  • 2002Veto Players3,490 cited
  • 2003Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work3,369 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
  • 1978Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo1,162 cited
  • 1996Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe955 cited
  • 1992The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process, by D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins766 cited
  • 2000Coalition Governments in Western Europe579 cited
  • 2003Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies557 cited
  • 2016East European constitutional review552 cited
  • 1995Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process536 cited
  • 1998Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure469 cited
  • 1996The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies465 cited
  • 1998Executive Decree Authority464 cited
  • 2001Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments

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