THE WASON TASK(S) AND THE PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION

Abstract

Abstract. The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind. 1. The Paradox of Confirmation Before getting into the recent (Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task, we will re-trace the historical (and philosophical) background of the Paradox of Confirmation. In this section, we will tell a revised and extended version of a story about (the history and philosophy of) The Paradox that that we have (partially) told elsewhere [6, 8, 7]. In section two, we move on to the Wason Task(s). 1.1. Hempel and Goodman on the Paradox of Confirmation. Not surprisingly, the Paradox of Confirmation involves a relation called the confirmation relation. For Hempel and Goodman (and also for Carnap, who’ll enter our

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