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Auctions with Budget Constraints
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Auctions with Budget Constraints (2004)Auctions with Budget ConstraintsTruthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Truthful approximation mechan…Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Combinatorial auctions with d…Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions (2003)Incentive compatible multi un…An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents (2003)An approximate truthful mecha…Competitive generalized auctions (2002)Competitive generalized aucti…Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2001)Combinatorial auctions with d…Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (2000)Bidding and allocation in com…Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches (1999)Taming the Computational Comp…An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions (1999)An Algorithm for Optimal Winn…Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions (1998)Computationally Manageable Co…Maximizing Group Performance While Minimizing Budget (2017)Maximizing Group Performance …Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders (2016)Breaking the logarithmic barr…Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions (2010)Inapproximability for VCG-bas…Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions (2007)Inapproximability Results for…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2010)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Marriage, honesty, and stability (2005)Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming (2011)Mechanism Design and Approximation (2014)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000)A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation (1991)Analyzing the Airwaves Auction (1996)Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (2002)The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions (2003)Market-Based Control (1996)Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2000)Combinatorial Auction Design (2003)10.1016/b978-044488002-4/50004-x (2000)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003)The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2005)An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents (2004)Item pricing for revenue maximization (2008)Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design (2005)Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains (2005)Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (2006)Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications to facility location, traffic routing and auctions (2003)CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions (2005)Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1998Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions1,024 cited
  • 2000Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions531 cited
  • 2005Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities471 cited
  • 1999Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches441 cited
  • 1999An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions325 cited
  • 2008Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions320 cited
  • 2001Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities230 cited
  • 2003Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions193 cited
  • 2002Competitive generalized auctions155 cited
  • 2003An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents125 cited

Cited by

  • 2017Maximizing Group Performance While Minimizing Budget76 cited
  • 2010Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions48 cited
  • 2016Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders39 cited
  • 2007Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions39 cited

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