The politics of presidential appointments: political control and bureaucratic performance

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Public Administration and Governance Public Policy and Administration Research American Constitutional Law and Politics

Abstract

List of Illustrations ix Acknowledgments xiii Chapter 1: Politicization in Theory and Practice 1 Chapter 2: The Nature and History of the Modern Personnel System 11 Chapter 3: Why, When, and Where Do Presidents Politicize the Bureaucracy? 51 Chapter 4: The Pattern of Politicization: A Quantitative Overview 80 Chapter 5: The Pattern of Politicization: A Closer Quantitative Analysis 103 Chapter 6: Politicization and Performance: The Case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 141 Chapter 7: Politicization and Performance: The Larger Pattern 172 Chapter 8: Learning the Lessons of Politicization 202 Notes 221 List of Interviews 265 References 267 Index 283

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1990Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?

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