Cross Holdings in Germany

Abstract

A characteristic of the German firms' ownership and control structure is the fact that the data featuring these markets are not available. Asking for reasons why concealing the control and shareholder structure is defended so strongly by representatives of banks and insurance companies, it becomes obvious that its aim is to hide a network of cross holdings among the most important German financial and industrial enterprises and to obscure the extreme concentration of power of banks and insurance companies in Germany. Cross holdings serve as restraints of competition in the market for corporate control to protect the powerful position of a small group of managers, whose power is based on widely spread shareholdings, the pooling of voting rights of nominee shareholders by proxy voting, and asset management by insurance and investment funds.

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