A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism

Bryan Pickel · Nicholas Mantegani

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

Ostrich nominalists often cite Quine's criterion of ontological commitment in order to claim that their view is more parsimonious than rival positions in ontology such as realism. We show that Quine's criterion, properly understood, does not support this claim. Indeed, we show that ostrich nominalism has a far more profligate ontology than realism

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1960Word and Object 1993A World of States of Affairs 1994Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture 2009On What Grounds What 1947Meaning and Necessity 2004Truth and Truthmakers 2008Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble 1996The Metaphysics of Properties

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2018Empiricism without magic: transformational abstraction in deep convolutional neural networks 2014The Sixth Meditation:2020A Theory of Truthmaking 2016Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based 2013Ostrich presentism 2015Relativities of fundamentality 2019Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking

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