How Is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?: Kant on the Distinction Between Philosophical and Mathematical Method

Abstract

I METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE AND THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION. In his important study on Kant and exact sciences, Michael Friedman argues rather convincingly that much of Kant's philosophical development can be understood, . . . as a continuous attempt to construct. . . a genuine metaphysical foundation for Newtonian natural philosophy.(1) Kant started his philosophical career as an adherent of what used loosely to be called Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics; but he became increasingly more skeptical of possibility of reconciling this metaphysics with exact sciences of his day. It was largely this conflict-ridden confrontation that brought Kant in end to a radical break with Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics. The critical Kant is out to find a better successor for this dogmatic--because uncritical--metaphysics. Not last among Kant's concerns in these matters is status of metaphysics as a theoretical science. For he realises that very nature of this discipline presents a thinker with substantial problems; a great deal of preliminary work will have to be done before a metaphysics can appear that satisfies all demands of a real science. The Kritik der reinen Vernunft should be viewed and understood in this context: [The] attempt to alter procedure which has hitherto prevailed in metaphysics, by completely revolutionising it in accordance with example set by geometers and physicists, forms indeed main purpose of this critique of pure speculative reason. It is a treatise on method, not a system of science itself. But at same time it marks out whole plan of both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure.(2) In other words, first Kritik is at least partly a work on methodology (or logic) of metaphysics.(3) Kant claims to have opened way with this study for any future metaphysics that will be able to present itself as a science, as subtitle of Prolegomena has it. Where possibility of metaphysics as a science is concerned, Kant assigns exact sciences function of an exemplar; for these disciplines have long been well established on the secure path of a science.(4) Accordingly, in Prolegomena Kant explicitly addresses question How is metaphysics possible as a science? by way of questions How is pure mathematics possible? and How is pure natural science possible?(5) Moreover, all these questions arise directly out of main transcendental question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? The deplorable situation of metaphysics of day would have been entirely attributable to misappraisal of this central transcendental question.(6) Yet from Kritik a different picture arises that at first glance does not seem to rhyme with exemplary image of exact sciences, in particular mathematics. For in last part of this work, which deals with transcendental doctrine of method, Kant presents an extensive comparison of method of mathematics with that of philosophy or, as case would have it, metaphysics. The result of this comparison is somewhat surprising, however. For there Kant arrives at conclusion that mathematics and philosophy, . . ., are none less so completely different, that procedure of one can never be imitated by other.(7) The philosopher should take precisely no notice of method of mathematician as an example. Use of mathematical method in field of metaphysics would only result in houses of cards. E. W. Beth once noted that chapter from Kritik in which Kant contrasts method of mathematics with that of philosophy contains a number of passages that are strongly reminiscent of pre-critical Untersuchung uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturlichen Theologie und der Moral; this little work first appeared in 1764, but it was written a year earlier. …

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