Pegging and stabilization policy in developing countries

Abstract

I review the case for pegging the exchange rate by surveying the recent theoretical literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes. This literature suggests that by enhancing the transparency or controllability of monetary policy, pegging may be more effective in lowering inflation expectations than other targets (such as money growth). However, under certain conditions a peg may be vulnerable to shifts in expectations. A peg also may require greater fiscal restraint by limiting the availability of inflation tax revenue; however, given certain economic distortions, policymakers may find it less costly to adopt expansionary fiscal policies under a peg than under a float. Pegging may stimulate growth by enhancing international trade or investment. However, it may reduce welfare by restricting the ability of policymakers to offset shocks. I also examine how pegging is associated with inflation and output in a sample of developing countries using a new exchange rate classification method. I find that a pegged exchange rate is associated with lower inflation and inflation volatility and with faster growth and similar output volatility. However, the theoretical survey suggests that any inferences should be drawn with care.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 23 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.