Constructing Cooperation: The Evolution of Institutions of Comanagement

Abstract

In a pathbreaking analysis, Sara Singleton explores the development of schemes for the management of fisheries in the northwestern United States in which native American tribes, and state, federal, and local governments cooperate to manage limited fishing resources. In the policy dispute over the apportionment of scarce resources, some argue that only government control or private ownership will prevent the destruction of limited common resources. The author shows how cooperation among interested parties can produce a workable system for self-management of common resources. Through the detailed study of the management of fisheries in the Northwest the author tests theories explaining the basis of collective action and social cooperation, an area of rich theoretical speculation in political science, law, economics and sociology. At the same time, her findings have important implications for policy makers who are interested in efficient and effective schemes of resource control that avoid the problems caused by regulation by remote government officials or private control. This book will appeal to policy makers concerned with the management of natural resources as well as to economists, political scientists, and sociologists concerned with collective action problems. Sara Singleton is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

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