The Effect of Shareholders’ Conflict over Dividend Policy on Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from Public Firms in Indonesia

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of conflict of interests between majority and minority shareholders over dividend policy on accounting conservatism. Shareholders conflict is proxied by dividend and majority shareholders’ control rights. The research is done on firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sample is determined by purposive sampling, consisting of 253 observations. The results of multivariate regression analysis with panel data regression techniques show that dividends have positive effect on accounting conservatism. Majority shareholders’ control rights also affect accounting conservatism. These results deepen the empirical evidence for Agency Theory from Agency Conflict Type II and prove that accounting conservatism made by management on concentrated ownership is under the control of majority shareholders. Therefore, majority shareholders can increase their utilities through the hands of management. Keywords : Agency Conflict Type II, Accounting Conservatism, Dividend Payout Ratio, Control Rights.

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