Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communismSimon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff2000-06-01articleJournal of Public Economics525 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Taxation and Compliance StudiesCrime, Illicit Activities, and GovernanceCorruption and Economic DevelopmentAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 525 citations exist upstream.References1993Corruption1994Politicians and Firms2000Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries1997The Unofficial Economy in Transition1996The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America1996The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand1998Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial EconomyCited by2003The Shadow Economy: An International Survey2007Deciding to Bribe: a Cross-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery Activity2005What Causes Firms to Hide Output?: The Determinants of Informality2002Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should2005Informal sector: The credit market channel2017When arm's length is too far: Relationship banking over the credit cycle2008Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model2005CORRUPTION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY*