The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the withinhousehold\ndistributional effect of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework\nof a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation\nsystem in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a\nsignificant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity.\nConsequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are entirely driven by the traditional\nsubstitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform\nalters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A\nsensitivity analysis shows that the collective model would be required if the tax reform was\nboth radical and of extended scope.
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