No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and provide an intuitive characterization of equilibrium investment. We show that investment in oligopoly, in the first and second best solution can be unambiguously ranked, in particular investment incentives are highest in the First Best solution and lowest under imperfect competition. We finally demonstrate that intervention of a social planer only at the production stage leads to strategic uncertainty at the investment stage and moreover decreases total investment below the level obtained under imperfect competition.
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 18 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.