The economic determinants of depreciation accounting in late nineteenth-century Britain

Abstract

This paper examines the economic incentives for unregulated companies, in late nineteenth-century Britain, to disclose in their published accounts the fact that they had charged depreciation. We argue that the disclosure will be positively associated with whether a company has outside shareholders and long-term debtholders, profitability, extent of depreciable assets, appointment of a professional auditor, and size. These hypotheses are tested using 150 British companies from the years 1880/81, 1889/90 and 1899/01. Our results indicate that whether depreciation was charged is related to profitability and, to a lesser extent, to the presence of outside shareholders, long-term debt holders and the appointment of a professional auditor. However, the amount of depreciation charged is related only to profitability and appears to be opportunistically determined.

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