The Domain of Reasons

John Skorupski

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

This text is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons.

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2015Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning 2014The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism 2016Fittingness First 2014A UNIFIED SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 2018Fittingness 2018A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief 2019The Fundamentality of Fit 2016In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

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