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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality
16 references·0 citing·33 second hop
Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality (2011)Belief, Voluntariness and IntentionalityOught to Believe (2008)Ought to BelieveDeontology and Descartes’s Demon (2008)Deontology and Descartes’s De…Doxastic freedom (2007)Doxastic freedomDoxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief (2003)Doxastic Compatibilism and th…Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation (2001)Voluntary Belief and Epistemi…Knowledge, Truth, and Duty (2001)Knowledge, Truth, and DutyDoxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology (2000)Doxastic Voluntarism and Epis…Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1995)Metaepistemology and Skeptici…Warrant: The Current Debate (1993)Warrant: The Current DebateEpistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. (1992)Epistemic Justification. Essa…Why Is Belief Involuntary? (1990)Why Is Belief Involuntary?Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1990)Metaepistemology and Skeptici…Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge (1990)Epistemic justification: essa…Belief and the Will (1984)Belief and the WillIntentionality (1983)IntentionalityBelief and Will (1954)Belief and WillA Treatise on Probability (1973)What is Justified Belief? (1979)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (1987)Highlights of Recent Epistemology (2001)Anti-luck epistemology (2006)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Moral Realism (2003)Contemporary debates in epistemology (2005)Epistemic Luck (2005)Learning from Words* (2006)Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style (2016)Knowledge and the Gettier Problem (2016)Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (1999)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics (1999)Deciding to Believe (2001)Equal treatment for belief (2018)Why epistemologists are so down on their luck (2006)Epistemic Normativity (2009)Curiosity was Framed* (2010)Can We Believe the Error Theory? (2013)Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability (2018)The wrongs of racist beliefs (2018)Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign* (2004)THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM (2013)Transparency and Self-Knowledge (2018)On a confusion about a function of consciousness (1995)The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (2000)Anthropomorphism and the social robot (2003)BOOTSTRAPPING, DEFEASIBLE REASONING, AND A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION (2010)Epistemic Entitlement (2011)When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction? (2017)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1983Intentionality4,569 cited
  • 1993Warrant: The Current Debate997 cited
  • 1984Belief and the Will536 cited
  • 1990Metaepistemology and Skepticism523 cited
  • 1990Epistemic justification: essays in the theory of knowledge330 cited
  • 2001Knowledge, Truth, and Duty197 cited
  • 2000Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology178 cited
  • 1992Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.171 cited
  • 1995Metaepistemology and Skepticism165 cited
  • 1990Why Is Belief Involuntary?158 cited
  • 2008Deontology and Descartes’s Demon153 cited
  • 2003Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief125 cited
  • 2008Ought to Believe103 cited
  • 2007Doxastic freedom103 cited
  • 1954Belief and Will92 cited
  • 2001Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation74 cited

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