The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: the Case of Economic Development

Abstract

This article explores the growing interest in �governance� in relation to the changing roles of markets, states, and partnerships in economic coordination. It also comments on the respective tendencies to failure of markets, states, and governance. The article first addresses the interest in governance and explains this in terms of recent theoretical developments as well as of fundamental shifts in economic, political, and social life. These latter changes suggests that issues of governance will remain a key issue for a long time and therefore merit careful consideration. The logic of �heterarchic governance� is then contrasted with the respective logics of anarchic, ex post coordination through market exchange and of imperative ex ante coordination through hierarchical forms of organization. Some preliminary reflections are offered on the nature, forms, and logic of �governance failure� with special reference to the constraints imposed by global capitalism, the insertion of governance arrangements into the wider political system, and specific dilemmas of governance arrangements themselves. These tendencies to failure are then related to the state�s increasing role in �meta-governance�, i.e., in managing the respective roles of these different modes of coordination. The article concludes with a call for a repertoire of modes of coordination.

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