Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It

Abstract

Introduction Daniel Carpenter and David Moss Part I. Failures of Capture Scholarship: 1. A revisionist history of regulatory capture William Novak 2. The concept of regulatory capture: a short, inglorious history Richard Posner 3. Detecting and measuring capture Daniel Carpenter Part II. New Conceptions of Capture - Mechanisms and Outcomes: 4. Cultural capture and the financial crisis James Kwak 5. Complexity, capacity, and capture Nolan McCarty 6. Preventing economists' capture Luigi Zingales 7. Corrosive capture? The dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation Daniel Carpenter Part III. Misdiagnosing Capture and Case Studies of Regulatory Success: 8. Capturing history: the case of the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 David Moss and Jonathan Lackow 9. Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture: evidence from coal mine safety regulation Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer 10. Captured by disaster? Reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill Christopher Carrigan 11. Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking Susan Webb Yackee 12. Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law Mariano-Florentino Cuellar Part IV. The Possibility of Preventing Capture: 13. Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs: some evidence from insurance regulation Daniel Schwarcz 14. Courts and regulatory capture M. Elizabeth Magill 15. Can executive review help prevent capture? Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore Conclusion David Moss and Daniel Carpenter Afterword Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach.

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