Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief

Michael G. Titelbaum

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a Bayesian framework for modelling rational degrees of belief - the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics.

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