Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government's Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD

Abstract

ERIC HERRING is a reader in international politics at the University of Bristol. He researches security, insecurity, and world politics. His books include Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy co-authored with Glen Rangwala and The Arms Dynamic in World Politics co-authored with Barry Buzan. PIERS ROBINSON is a senior lecturer in international politics at the University of Manchester. He researches communications, conflict, and world politics. His is lead author of Pockets of Resistance: British News Media, Theory and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and The CNN Effect: the Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED A DOSSIER on 24 September 2002 setting out its claims regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).1 Parliament was recalled for an emergency session on the same day to hear Prime Minister Tony Blair's presentation of it. The dossier stated that Iraq had WMD and was producing more. After the invasion in March 2003, no WMD were found. Ever since, there has been controversy as to whether the dossier reported accurately intelligence which turned out to be wrong, as Blair has claimed consistently, or whether the dossier deliberately deceived by intentionally giving the impression of greater Iraqi WMD capability and threat than the intelligence suggested. Despite a great deal of attention to the September dossier, there has not been any analysis conceptually well developed enough, or sufficiently grounded in the empirical evidence, to make much headway in resolving this disagreement. This article assesses the extent to which the dossier was part of a campaign of organized political persuasion and whether that campaign involved demonstrable deception. It shows that the dossier did not accurately represent the content and strength of intelligence that turned out to be wrong. Instead, the dossier portrayed a misleading picture of greater capability and greater certainty than the intelligence warranted. The misleading nature of the dossier was not an accident. There was a concerted effort by many of those involved in producing the dossier to push the claims about the intelligence as far as possible. The phrase “dodgy dossier” was originally used to describe this September dossier.2 The British government published another dossier on 3 February 2003 which was exposed as being mostly plagiarized.3 Subsequently, the term “dodgy dossier” has tended to be applied mainly to this second dossier. In view of the arguments in this article, the September dossier ought to be known as the deceptive dossier. The argument in this article is structured in four sections. The first section surveys official claims regarding the dossier, the results of four successive inquiries (the fifth has not yet reported), and the scholarly literature to date. Here the article shows that, despite some discussion of the dossier in numerous publications, there has not been an analysis of its and which is conceptually well developed and which on that has in the The second section out the the to the empirical The article shows that the dossier was misleading about the intelligence and that and was The the of the deceptive dossier. involved in the September that was an and by the intelligence and to a to the in Blair stated that in the to the of the September dossier. to was intelligence was Blair's and the of the dossier as a of the intelligence that had government dossier was to be the Prime Minister had been and in part of the intelligence that was a of was an in that be about the of the as the had the The to the of the intelligence the known as and the and to to the Prime Minister and the to an the of government and intelligence that the and intelligence in a that not in the A of official in with official In a published in 2003, the of Foreign some of the dossier and the strength with which some claims were that not or to on its and that the claims in the dossier in well on the of the intelligence In the same the British and that, the dossier reported of the no political was on the and the was not The in with its that the dossier had the of the the Iraq as as that was with the did not or to be or and was in a The in in a and has the to date. It that the in which the was in the dossier, and Blair's 24 September 2002 the dossier, the impression of greater intelligence certainty than was the and than the in this that was the of has known as and this the dossier. that in a in the dossier in to Iraqi than was by the the in that in the dossier to not the of the intelligence The intelligence is at on this article is to of the that the dossier did not the by the that a the inquiries intelligence that the the intelligence that Iraq had The literature a of than the official of that the dossier was in a for the of the view of Iraqi WMD He about the nature of and the of in the of the dossier as not or a article not out and that this article in its and that and in the presentation of the not Instead, on as the the of intelligence in that Iraq had as and the that Iraq had WMD in of the of in which political a view and the intelligence to that this not or for the that those producing the dossier there was a to and the intelligence the of intelligence to on Iraq in a of the intelligence that claims of certainty were that were not by the not much to about as is on the of intelligence to of the literature the of intelligence for political that the dossier involved and in to make the for with of the dossier a and with This is a presentation of a than a of and that Blair the intelligence to make the for In a is to on to the Blair and the dossier claimed on the and the intelligence on the and to those In this article the involved to than it. Glen Rangwala and a that the the that Blair deliberately the and this and the to were published in or in to the and were the which has not the or empirical regarding the dossier. with those the dossier as of intelligence to the campaign to not those and analysis to and its and the intelligence for WMD mainly Blair for of the that the September dossier involved the of as is on the the dossier a of and that the claims that or were that for that Iraq had He not to of intelligence on Iraq than in His is the same as that of and the certainty and and and the is of the of the published an on British intelligence and Iraqi WMD in In the British intelligence the the is to and The of published in to being in the of the on setting out and the the dossier and the intelligence was of His discussion of the dossier and is and to and In the literature on the September dossier has a to and an of a to the and presentation of the and an with the that has in the This article that and to an of the dossier that This to about whether the dossier was part of a campaign of organized political persuasion and whether that campaign involved deception. This The first whether the September dossier was an and of the intelligence as part of an to the British whether involved a presentation of the intelligence in to In is the dossier accurately as the of organized political The second the extent to which the dossier involved that political persuasion and deceptive organized political persuasion as political a phrase in this article, to a and to in to for a in include political and In and of in the to to in a about a and the of an organized and to this the of is the the of as an to which not the to and that is at an to in a about an and another as to is a to to The phrase political the of the and It in a and the or of many of It of organized political persuasion with deception. of organized political persuasion the of and deceptive organized political organized political persuasion be in a that is and or be in a that deception. to on and by the of and deceptive organized political of political persuasion of and the at which organized political persuasion deceptive is the and political is a It is to to in to the of a and of in to about the of a the and there that be used to organized political persuasion there is as a that or to be in to and be were to be exposed as and a to of be to make the being the article to this as with of It is deceptive those involved that an not be the This a in a deliberately misleading to the being of and to of and to the of whether the of in is the of and the of or by those This by whether the dossier or or involved and whether a to about the of the that the dossier was misleading is an than and is to the of and on the part of those or of a regarding this be The first that with the official that the dossier was an to is the of the dossier and the lead to the Iraq The dossier in the to make the to the for British for to than in to for The of had been a of the and the of an for to be In the of some in the the to in Iraq was on the British March 2002 that the British government the government that a to to the the and Parliament by Iraq on and a to make the on the of Iraq of the British of the was that was The were those the much greater on to at a of in to the that the was The British government much greater with the great to any This to the on threat than a threat that was of a in the in February there were about the of intelligence regarding WMD A February and in to a of to a to the on WMD of This is the of the of for the dossier, and the that to a to a dossier to in a of to on a of the to the in that were a for setting out the on WMD in a of on the to this in be by the March the the and in the to be in to an invasion of the of which to the and the for campaign to of the that and to in the and A March the of the be a to at to to The this to of on to of the as well as of the for to the was the for on the of an Iraqi WMD threat and with on In the dossier was part of a campaign of organized political A with a dossier that Iraq and was that the intelligence did not that Iraq was the of the four or to be and not the to the the for and of in to on March the to whether the Foreign is as not Iraq be first and The has to there is an threat It not this this a on The Foreign that an did not Iraq a greater threat than of The some of of to whether be the This the of the that in of Iraq is not that the same of at the Foreign and that the intelligence be in a to the was that to the by the of about of much to the in the on and to to with that this not in the a be to the and out that of had the be for a the on the for was not in the dossier shows an official an for deception. a that a had been to on and the a was those Blair had on March that that the of the intelligence regarding and of He stated that the WMD than 3 on to describe this to and and that presentation of Iraq on the and arguments for A to Blair March the stated that the far has been to whether the threat Iraq is that of and as to He the by Iraq the same as the of in of an not in of in of the to deal with the A of to to the and to Iraq is much than and the dossier on the of being in was that its be was in the in 2002 and had a in intelligence for the dossier. He the to in the of some and that dossier which was the four dossier did not make a for and to be this and to the the of and to to more. of this was to make a for the on the dossier and the of intelligence in to in and the with on to to the for a WMD and about the that be published in 2002 Weapons of Mass Destruction This was the of the dossier. a of the dossier was to which was a by The was by the Foreign as an which on a of government and the of the A Blair's of the to make a for on Iraqi to a for than for It to be on WMD than or to make the a and a for on WMD to the of campaign had at the of in This campaign was not about the about a WMD threat or to a for was about a for as part of a campaign of organized political by was being that by the was as intelligence on Iraq far of that there was a threat Iraqi or that Iraq was in of the that had the government in March was there in The was in in to a campaign regarding Iraqi in the the of intelligence as well as with the include an on a official to to make the the claims about in the Despite the of of a Blair on 3 September that a dossier be of a setting out the that to be be by the Prime Minister and the Foreign to the that a with and as to and to the for the of the be is not the or the of to a on the or the of the dossier in to this dossier is to be to the argument There is no that that be on or this or that be used the day to that the dossier to be and that and be in of the dossier Blair at the in was as of the this was in to the and certainty that in the were with this was that that in the of or in the dossier on this is the of the The political of the dossier was as being to being as the of intelligence and despite in that the dossier the of the there were the and Blair's on and September with senior and regarding the dossier and reported that was to on the presentation on and September that was by of the at the September part of Iraq of government this on and on the News and were involved in the dossier and on September the of a of the dossier This has been with and in the Foreign had a of the dossier on the of this the out in the is the 24 the government has claimed that September was a to on its with regarding to that September dossier was a of the that had been in for with were not intelligence a about the and the of that to September and September was that had was to be used by as the were to that the dossier a In an the author in the the be out or the is to the being to the to the intelligence on and was to hear and that, to the intelligence a to this in the It that there be published that and not that the dossier had to be and to that was and and part of a It was this that about the to WMD and about was and used in the September and the September of the dossier. the and September dossier were there was that were official that of the is to to that the of an on be to this than to the official to in a of with this as September that the the to be as as the of the This is a for any of intelligence that and be the same in a to of the and in the In at the WMD to be as and as to the extent to which to for is and that this the of the in of being a that to be the that be by of the of on which not The of this was that the dossier a impression of the threat Iraq and of the certainty of the The this the dossier, were about the intelligence on which some of were being in the dossier with the impression that there was and intelligence the than was the this be regarding the in to the dossier, its in February the first the dossier was not a of the intelligence by the of and to in to Instead, the dossier was and in to a campaign of organized political This is by its in to British for Iraq and the intelligence and The was to the the and the that Iraq was a WMD threat in to the for the second the the of the dossier that this campaign of organized political persuasion was a deceptive and This be in the to the dossier on Iraq to the that Iraq was not an WMD the that the intelligence did not make a for the to and and the for to is on at the or as that the to the claims in the dossier the view that the had the certainty or nature of the There is no of in which there was or that the intelligence was or Instead, the that of those its the the picture that to and the intelligence The was to that the intelligence did not that Iraq was and to that be in the threat in the not that, as was that not be The deceptive claims were to as the article the of the to the of an intelligence by of the of the The was at the as a on The the which was which in on did was in the its this is not as as be and there is a to the dossier. 2002 the intelligence had been to a that Iraq was producing and and the of the that claimed the of and had been by the Iraqi the of far as be at and no of and Instead, was mainly a that be The stated that there were that this a In the had that be to and intelligence in the has the nature of was a the of at the of the stated that was to in in or four the a section of a of and its The the and political an of intelligence about Iraqi of and in 2002 a on that on WMD The that the the lead was a of the to in the to the and was in Despite being and on a a the to the to was to the and with with official Blair about in the of Blair's and He the on as and in to as were that this was a with a about the nature of of the a not to of on a of intelligence be to the Prime an Prime Minister was in a there was a of a to The about the was to the to for on Blair to been with the stated that had an at the political In to its in to the and to the the that on the part of were that were on the as to whether there been much the in was to be the of is the of whether the a of and in the Prime Minister by giving in be on which turned out not to be is for to a on this was an the that the and the of with to senior with the of a had on the dossier that not been were in to the that Iraq was producing and the that Iraq had WMD that be and the strength of Blair's in the to the dossier. was used to the certainty of the that Iraq was to and to the of the September to intelligence which of and is The September of the dossier on the is that has of and and the and the of and of Blair on September regarding the dossier regarding was that was and not to be and with In the of intelligence the greater strength of the is well The September to that has to and This out as the first in a of in the (the second was the which is was the for that which to as not to was the with to not that was this of the the was the of intelligence that had the September and which been used as the to the dossier that was is that senior to intelligence that had been used for the September and of and that of the in to the the that to those the dossier that of and was The that a for the in intelligence that Iraq was producing and senior were intelligence in to of the the that was regarding this has the of the dossier regarding the did not and the used the term with to and did not the was used to certainty to the dossier. the September and the September dossier the that Iraq the dossier was of which accurately the September to that there to be It is not on this was as there was no intelligence on the September This the of whether senior intelligence and to this be to in the the for the to in the dossier in to the is The of the senior than that of the Prime After that the to to had a in the dossier in to Iraqi than was by the the of had a with the on September He that to the Prime Minister the of the and to that the was and that the be that, in the of the at that in the of and in on the dossier, this of to be to this than been the Blair and not to been by the about the to This is its and the that the on as as its was that had that not be published in the dossier had not been He was that was not that there was no in the dossier at the to the dossier, to intelligence was not and that and had and this not be in to stated that at the September to the of the the of was there was some in there which be used It that the of being published in the dossier to the on as by did to be in the dossier that were on in this was used to in the dossier that Iraq was to and the was to in regarding the that Iraq WMD of the being of intelligence in September the the an was and in The the was and that in the of Despite as the second in the of the dossier and was in Blair's and 24 September to the the of the dossier, had been by the strength of the to the of as been this in on of the dossier being and as with the the of the as a a in with the September which to intelligence as that WMD be on that the September the of the as a and the that there was no that Iraq was or had that had the strength of the to the as well as its as a in the to the were as and did not at the the was with the at a by Tony of the on the of September was not to the by any In a with a that intelligence had which was that not and which the being regarding the and with

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