SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
15 references·2 citing·38 second hop
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude (2012)Against the Being For Account of Normativ…Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists (2011)Normative uncertainty for non…Value and the right kind of reason (2010)Value and the right kind of r…Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices (2009)Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues …EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE (2009)EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTIT…Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (2009)Being For: Evaluating the Sem…Thinking How to Live (2008)Thinking How to LiveThe Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem (2008)The Right Kind of Solution to…Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (2008)Being For: Evaluating the Sem…What Are Degrees of Belief? (2007)What Are Degrees of Belief?Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds? (2007)Ecumenical Expressivism: The …Brentano and the Buck-Passers (2007)Brentano and the Buck-PassersThe Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)The Strike of the Demon: On F…Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation (2004)Evaluation, Uncertainty, and …Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation (2002)Evaluation, Uncertainty and M…Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation (2002)Evaluation, Uncertainty and M…Fallibility for Expressivists (2020)Fallibility for ExpressivistsNon-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder (2017)Non-Cognitivism and Fundament…11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Value in ethics and economics (1994)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Epistemic Partiality in Friendship (2006)The Nature of Normativity (2007)Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Myth of Conventional Implicature (1999)Slaves of the Passions (2007)Metaethical Contextualism Defended (2010)Reason‐Giving and the Law (2011)Contexts as Shared Commitments (2015)Language, Truth, and Logic. (1938)Spreading the word (1984)Does MITE Make Right? (2016)Moral uncertainty (2017)Practical Expressivism (2021)What is a Law of Nature? (1983)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)The relationship between belief and credence (2020)The right and the wrong kind of reasons (2017)Fittingness (2018)Moral Uncertainty (2020)Disagreements about taste (2010)The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics (2011)Morality and Mathematics (2020)Fittingness First (2016)A puzzle about epistemic akrasia (2012)Dynamics of Epistemic Modality (2013)Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)What is the Frege‐Geach Problem? (2008)Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest (2009)Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge (2009)Do psychopaths really threaten moral rationalism? (2006)Hume's Morality (2008)The Myth of Practical Consistency (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2004The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value721 cited
  • 2008Thinking How to Live517 cited
  • 2007Brentano and the Buck-Passers223 cited
  • 2007What Are Degrees of Belief?221 cited
  • 2009Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism211 cited
  • 2010Value and the right kind of reason173 cited
  • 2009Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices156 cited
  • 2008Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism148 cited
  • 2002Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation141 cited
  • 2011Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists110 cited
  • 2007Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?108 cited
  • 2004Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation90 cited
  • 2002Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation77 cited
  • 2008The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem66 cited
  • 2009EXPRESSIVISM AND MORAL CERTITUDE63 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Fallibility for Expressivists33 cited
  • 2017

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
25 cited