SZodixStudyAcademic Library

Shelves Open access

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions · Study

WorkTwo Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

Shahar Dobzinski2007

Work2007

Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

Shahar Dobzinski

105 citations·0/0 files stored·Lecture notes in computer science

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

No abstract was published for this record.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 105 citations exist upstream.

References

2007Algorithmic Game Theory 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design 2007Algorithmic Game Theory: Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria 2007Algorithmic Game Theory: Computing in Games 1999Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms 2005Internet and Network Economics 2007Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)

Cited by

2017Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey 2010Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders 2011An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations 2014Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices 2011Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments 2012The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions 2008

Related works

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

2007Limitations of VCG-based mechanismsother · 12 shared references 2012A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanismsarticle · 8 shared references 2008On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and schedulingother · 8 shared references 2009On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Designother · 8 shared references 2012Online Mechanism Design (Randomized Rounding on the Fly)other · 8 shared references 2008On the Hardness of Being Truthfulother · 7 shared references

Details

Year2007

Typeother

Published2007-01-01

VenueLecture notes in computer science

ISSN-L0302-9743

Languageen

Citations105

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

Identifiers

doi10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7

openalex_workW1580387990

Links

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.

On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling

2012Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian