The Place of Quine in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Gideon Rosen: Quine and the Revival of Metaphysics: Quine's critique of Carnap's positivism and Quine's alternative account of scientific and philosophical methodology set the stage for the revival of metaphysics in the 1970s and 80s. The key ingredients in this transition were (a) Quine's insistence that theory choice in the sciences is governed by holistic, pragmatic considerations, (b) his claim that the sciences nonetheless give us reason to believe in the items they posit, and (c) his insistence that theory choice in philosophy is continuous with scientific theory choice in all respects. The chapter presents Quine's account of theory choice and highlights the respects in which post-Quinean metaphysics owes its methodological self-conception to Quine's work.

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