Central Bank Behavior and Credibility: Some Recent Theoretical Developments

Alex Cukierman A

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Global Financial Crisis and Policies Economic theories and models

Abstract

Alex Cukierman describes recent theories that show how the motives, constraints, and information of policymakers and the public determine monetary policy outcomes. Cukierman explains that the recent theoretical literature on central bank behavior can be divided into positive and normative categories.

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy 1982Reputation and imperfect information 1980Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts 1973Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs.1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model 1977Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule

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1991Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary System 1992MONETARY POLICY GAMES AND PRIVATE SECTOR PRECOMMITMENT 1997Sustainable monetary policies 1994Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy: Two decades of progress 1988Monetary Theory and Policy 2015Central Bank Credibility: An Historical and Quantitative Exploration

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