The Distribution of Public Services: An Exploration of Local Governmental Preferences

Abstract

A local governmental welfare function is specified to explore two of its central characteristics: the equity-productivity trade-off and differential weights across neighborhoods. The constrained maximization model is estimated using service outcomes (safety) in the welfare function, as opposed to publicly provided inputs (police), over neighborhoods. The equity-productivity trade-off is found to be considerable, and not all neighborhoods are weighted equally. The results show that inequality aversion and unequal concern by local government over service outcomes must be addressed explicitly to understand the observed distribution of publicly provided inputs, with important implications for standard analysis of local governmental behavior. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 81 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.