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Contracting with governments
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References

  • 2005Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy4,810 cited
  • 2003The Logic of Political Survival4,214 cited
  • 2001The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model2,041 cited
  • 2010Violence and social orders: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history1,945 cited
  • 2000Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective1,944 cited
  • 1968Why Regulate Utilities?1,046 cited
  • 1972Why Regulate Utilities ?989 cited
  • 1976Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV863 cited
  • 1989Auctions and Bidding: A Primer851 cited
  • 1999Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost economics perspectives785 cited
  • 2005Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?692 cited
  • 1993The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement568 cited
  • 2008Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis444 cited
  • 2004Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right396 cited
  • 1991Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts322 cited

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  • 2002Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement \n244 cited
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