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The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment
3 references·14 citing·45 second hop
The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment (2016)The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agree…The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements (2016)The Competitive Effects of Ve…Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price (1986)Anticompetitive Exclusion: Ra…Why Regulate Utilities ? (1972)Why Regulate Utilities ?Simpler and better: Supply chain contracting in the presence of contract unobservability and upstream competition (2021)Simpler and better: Supply ch…Electricity supply chain coordination: Newsvendor model for optimal contract design (2020)Electricity supply chain coor…Diagnosing Foreclosure due to Exclusive Dealing (2016)Diagnosing Foreclosure due to…Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts (2013)Competition with Exclusive Co…BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION (2011)BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND CO…Exclusive contracts foster relationship‐specific investment (2007)Exclusive contracts foster re…The effect of physician–hospital affiliations on hospital prices in California (2005)The effect of physician–hospi…The Economics of Vertical Restraints (2003)The Economics of Vertical Res…Chapter 27 Antitrust and competition in health care markets (2000)Chapter 27 Antitrust and comp…Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice (1998)Exclusive Dealing and Busines…Strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts (1994)Strategic buyers and exclusio…Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly (1993)Equilibrium Incentives for Ex…The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing (1990)The Dampening-of-Competition …Chapter 11 Vertical contractual relations (1989)Chapter 11 Vertical contractu…The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1979)Free Entry and Social Inefficiency (1986)Naked Exclusion: Reply (2000)Naked Exclusion: Reply (2000)Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space (2010)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets (1999)Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications (1999)The Strategy of Conflict (1960)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors (2000)Agricultural trade liberalization and economic development: the role of downstream market power (2007)THE COMPETITIVENESS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT AND INPUT MARKETS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF RECENT RESEARCH (2016)An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints (1984)The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look (1984)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Linear demand systems for differentiated goods: Overview and user’s guide (2020)Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure (1990)Testing for Selectivity Bias in Panel Data Models (1992)A Primer on Foreclosure (2007)Do Physicians Possess Market Power? (2014)Changes in Hospital–Physician Affiliations in U.S. Hospitals and Their Effect on Quality of Care (2016)How vertical integration affects the quantity and cost of care for Medicare beneficiaries (2017)Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets (1976)The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987)Vertical Separation and Horizontal Mergers (1995)Strategic Delegation with Multiproduct Firms (2004)Transaction Cost Determination of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements (2004)Coordination in a supply chain with two manufacturers, two substitute products, and one retailer (2018)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model (2021)Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence (1986)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance (2015)Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information (2018)Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV (1976)Regulation and Administered Contracts (1976)Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics (1989)Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights (1989)Empirical studies of entry and exit: A survey of the evidence (1994)The Case for Antitrust Enforcement (2003)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1972Why Regulate Utilities ?989 cited
  • 1986Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price355 cited
  • 2016The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements141 cited

Cited by

  • 1989Chapter 11 Vertical contractual relations118 cited
  • 2005The effect of physician–hospital affiliations on hospital prices in California107 cited
  • 1993Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly106 cited
  • 1994Strategic buyers and exclusionary contracts100 cited
  • 2000Chapter 27 Antitrust and competition in health care markets82 cited
  • 2013Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts81 cited
  • 1990The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing77 cited
  • 2016Diagnosing Foreclosure due to Exclusive Dealing74 cited
  • 2011BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION72 cited
  • 2007Exclusive contracts foster relationship‐specific investment72 cited
  • 1998Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice71 cited
  • 2003The Economics of Vertical Restraints70 cited

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2020
Electricity supply chain coordination: Newsvendor model for optimal contract design
29 cited
  • 2021Simpler and better: Supply chain contracting in the presence of contract unobservability and upstream competition15 cited