Consciousness: An Afterthought

Stevan R. Harnad

191 citations0/0 files storedCogPrints (University of Southampton)

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Philosophy and Theoretical Science Embodied and Extended Cognition Free Will and Agency

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Our sense that we do something deliberately may be an afterthought that arises after our brains have already triggered our action unconsciously. Consciousness itself may be a similar illusory afterthought, with no direct causal role. In any case, Methodological epiphenomenalism, together with the Turing Test, seem to be be the best strategy for cognitive modelling.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 191 citations exist upstream.

Cited by

1991Evidence against epiphenomenalism 1991Consciousness from a first-person perspective 1991The function of consciousness or of information?1994Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't 2007The Neural Time Factor in Conscious and Unconscious Events 1992Begging the question against phenomenal consciousness 1992Time and consciousness 1995Why and how we are not zombies

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.