Article2006

Words and Thoughts: Subsentences, Ellipsis, and the Philosophy of Language

286 citations0/0 files stored

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation Categorization, perception, and language Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

Abstract

It is a near truism of philosophy of language that sentences are prior to words - that they are the only things that fundamentally have meaning. This work interrogates this idea drawing on a body of evidence to argue that speakers can and do use mere words, not sentences, to communicate complex thoughts.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 286 citations exist upstream.

Cited by

2013From Utterances to Speech Acts 2014Contrast and Island Sensitivity in Clausal Ellipsis 2015How Much Context Is Enough? Two Cases of Span-Conditioned Stem Allomorphy 2018The Oxford Handbook of Ellipsis 2015Grammar in Everyday Talk: Building Responsive Actions 2009Phrasal and clausal comparatives in Greek and the abstractness of syntax 2016Alternative Semantics 2009The Explicit/Implicit Distinction in Pragmatics and the Limits of Explicit Communication

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.