Governança corporativa, desempenho e valor da empresa no Brasil.

Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira

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Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Law Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

Corporate Governance, Performance and Firm Value in BrazilCorporate governance seeks to increase the probability that suppliers of financial resources will assure themselves the return on their investment through a set of mechanisms including the Board of Directors.The subject has growing importance, because it is well spread the hypothesis that corporate governance affects firm value.The question is to find out if there is a "better" or "ideal" corporate governance structure for the firm.Several corporate governance codes were prepared with this purpose.In Brazil, we highlight the IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance) and the CVM (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission) codes.T his dissertation investigates if the corporate governance structure was important to Brazilian listed companies from 1998 to 2000 and if the companies more adjusted to the IBGC and CVM recommendations achieved higher market value or superior performance.Three governance variables were considered: the separation of chief executive officer and chairman positions (DE), board size (TOT), and board independence (INDEP).The multiple regression method with cross sectional data was applied between firm value and performance dependent variables and corporate governance independent variables.The variable chief executive officer as chairman (DE) has showed the most important results, with strong evidence that, on average, firms with different people in charge of the chief executive officer and chairman positions have higher market value than the others.The variable board size (TOT) has showed a clear non linear relation, suggesting that firms with an intermediate number of directors achieve superior performance.The variable independence of the board (INDEP) has not showed a significant relation against the variables of value and performance.

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References

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