Optimal selling strategies for oil and gas leases with an informed buyer

Kenneth Hendricks · Robert H. Porter · Guofu Tan

38 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

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Auction Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

A study is presented on whether the US Government can increase its revenues from the sale of drainage leases by using a different allocation mechanism. The optimal mechanism is characterized for selling a lease when there is a single informed buyer and a fixed number of uniformed buyers. Implementation and the magnitude of potential revenue gains, if any, are discussed.

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1988An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information

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2007Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions

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