Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies

Mathias Dewatripont · Eric S. Maskin

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Economic theories and models Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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Abstract We investigate how the degree to which credit markets are centralized affects efficiency when there is asymmetric information. Specifically, we argue that decentralization of credit may promote efficient project selection when creditors are not fully informed ex ante about project quality.

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