Principal-Agent Problems in Commercial-Bank Failure Decisions

Asli Demirgüç‐Kunt

16 citations0/0 files storedWorking paper

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Corporate Insolvency and Governance Global Financial Regulation and Crises

Abstract

The author develops a model that examines the regulator's role in the bank failure decision process, with attention given to the regulator's constraints and incentives.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 16 citations exist upstream.

References

1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have 1984Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government 1977Early warning of bank failure 1985Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results 1975A MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROBLEM BANKS 1978Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition 1976The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation.

Cited by

1995Separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.