this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
- 1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have18,936 cited
- 1998Law and Finance17,902 cited
- 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
- 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
- 1981Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information12,762 cited
- 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring8,393 cited
- 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
- 1997Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?6,790 cited
- 1987Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment4,354 cited
- 1992Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt3,902 cited
- 1982Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation3,178 cited
- 1984Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends3,109 cited
- 1991Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups2,361 cited
- 1985What's different about banks?2,347 cited
Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work