Any plausible account of language evolution must root language in forms of behavior that are “pragmatic” rather than “communicative” but must also offer a bridge from “doing” to “communicating about doing”. Our key addition to the argument for a gestural basis for language (e.g., Hewes, 1973; Kimura, 1993; Armstrong et al., 1995; MacNeilage, in press) is to assert the crucial role of an observation/execution matching system for grasping in monkeys which provides a representation of “expectations” which can both guide the monkey’s own actions and enable it to comprehend the actions of other monkeys. We will argue that it is the addition of such an observation system that provides the necessary bridge from “doing” to “communicating about doing”. This claim is bolstered by the finding that observation/execution system is located in monkey in an area that is considered the homolog of Broca’s area in humans. We then offer a “case grammar” for grasping that suggests the continuity between praxis and language. However, we stress mechanisms that seem to distinguish language from other forms of praxis and analyze a number of human brain mechanisms, including those for consciousness, in that light.
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