Philosophy without Intuitions

Herman Cappelen

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.

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